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CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
TEE power of courts to punish summarily for criminal contempt is, 
as Mr. Justice Black recently observed, “ an anomaly in the 
law.” The Justice continued as follows : 
“ The vices of a summary trial are only aggravated by the 
fact that the judge’s power to punish criminal contempt is 
exercised without effective external restraint. First, the sub- 
stantive scope of the offense of contempt is inordinately 
sweeping and vague; it has been defined, for example, a% ‘ any 
conduct that tends to bring the authority and administration 
of the law into disrespect or disregard.’ It would be no over- 
statement therefore to say that the offense with the most 
ill-dehed and elastic contours in our law is now punished by 
the harshest procedures known to that law. Secondly, a defen- 
dant’s principal assurance that he will be fairly tried and 
punished is the largely impotent review of a cold record by an 
appellate court, another body of judges. Once in a great’while 
a particular appellate tribunal basically hostile to summary 
proceedings will closely police contempt trials but such super- 
vision is only isolated and fleeting, All too often the reviewing 
courts stand aside readily with the formal declaration that 
‘ the trial judge has not abused his discretion.’ But even at its 
rare best appellate review cannot begin to take the place of 
trial in the first instance by an impartial jury subject to review 
on the spot by an uncommitted trial judge. Finally, as the 
law now stands there are no limits on the punishment a judge 
can impose on a defendant whom he finds guilty of contempt 
except for whatever remote restrictions exist in the Eighth 
Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual punish- 
ments or in the nebulous requirements of ‘ reasonableness ’ 
now promulgated by the majority.” 
The power of English and American courts to punish summarily 
for construbtive contempt-chiefly contempts by publication out of 
court-is derived from the same sources, namely, Mr. Justice 
Wilmot’s undelivered judgment in The King v. Almon and Lord 
Chancellor Hardwicke’s pronouncements in Roach v. Garvan.‘ I n  
practice today, however, there is a wide divergence. In England 
the power to punish as contemptuous publications “ calculated to 
interfere with the due course of justice ” has been carried by the 
courts to what some consider extreme limits. In  the United States, 
1 Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 193 (1958). 
2 Ibid., at 199. 
3 Wilmot, Notes of Opinions and Judgments, 943 (1802). 
4 2 Atk. 469 (Ch. 1742). Also cited as Re Read and Huggenson and as the St. 
James’s Evening Post case. 
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this power has been emasculated by statutory and constitutional 
limitations. How are we to account for this difference in 
direction ? 
In  the early years of American legal development, Blackstone 
was often the sole source of authority and he had accepted the 
views of Mr. Justice Wilmot and published them as the law of 
England.s The first statute bearing on the contempt powers of 
federal courts was enacted in the first Judiciary Act of 1789. 
Section 17 stated that federal courts '' shall have power to . . . 
punish by h e  or imprisonment, a t  the discretion of said courts, 
all contempts of authority in any cause or hearing before the 
same. . . ." The generality of this language suggests an'intent to 
codify those powers to punish for contempt possessed by English 
courts at common law. In  the early nineteenth century, following 
what were considered several flagrant abuses of the contempt power, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and the Federal Government enacted 
statutes strictly curtailing the power to punish for constructive 
contempt. The Federal Act of 1881 confined the summary power 
of punishment to ". . . misbehaviour of any person . . . in the 
presence of the . . . courts, or so near thereto as to obstruct the 
administration of justice. . . ." The lower federal courts, aware of 
the events prompting the enactment of this statute, respected its 
restrictions. Many states copied the new federal law.? 
It is clear that the Act was intended to limit drastically the 
contempt power. During the following century, however, the 
historical antecedents of the Act became obscured and it was 
vitiated by a broad construction. In  Toledo Newspaper Co. v. 
United States,8 the Supreme Court construed the " so near 
thereto " provision in a causal rather than a geographical sense. 
As a result, substantially all of the pre-1818 powers were resur- 
rected. Under a '' reasonable tendency " test adopted to avoid the 
geographical limitation imposed by the Act, contempt proceedings 
against the press were left largely in the discretion of the trial 
judge. The test permitted the presiding judge to punish summarily 
for contempt if the publication had a " reasonable tendency " or 
" an inherent tendency " to interfere with justice. His discretion 
would not be questioned unless greatly misused. 
The Toledo Newspaper case was the federal law of contempt by 
publication until 1940 when it was overruled in N y e  v. United 
5 Sir John Fox has shown that Wilmot's views found their way into the 
Commentaries publishe! in 1769, and, through them, strongly affecte!, Anglo- 
American law. Fox, The Summary Process to Punish Contempt (1909) 
25 L.Q.R. 2.38, 247, 25S254. 
6 4 Stat. 487 (1831). Currently see, 18 U.S.C.A. 401 (1948). 
7 For a history of this development, see Nelles & King, " Contempt by 
pblication in the United States," 98 Col.L.Rev. 401, 626 (1998) and Ludwig, 
Journalism and Justice in Criminal Law," 98 StJohn L.Rev. 197 (1964). 
8 247 U.S. 402 (1918). 
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 state^.^ The Supreme Court there returned to a strict interpreta- 
tion of this Act, giving the words “ so near thereto ” a geograph- 
ical instead of. a causal meaning. Since most press publication 
occurs neither in the presence of the court nor “ near thereto ” 
geographically, the power to punish contemptuous publications was 
made ineffectual. 
Inasmuch as the N y e  case concerned a federal statute the power 
of state courts was not affected. The following year, however, the 
Supreme Court held that constitutional guarantees of freedom of 
the press forbade both state and federal courts from punishing for 
constructive contempt press comment on pending cases unless the 
comment presented a “ clear and present danger ” to the orderly 
and impartial administration of justice. 
The first case raising this issue was Bridges v. California and its 
companion case, Times-Mirror Co. v. California.lo In these cases a 
prominent labour leader and a leading anti-labour newspaper both 
sought to prevent state court judges from interfering with their 
freedom to comment on the way pending cases should be decided. 
I n  the first case, a state judge had decided that a local of long- 
shoremen was not entitled to transfer its allegiance from an A F  of 
L union to a CIO union. While a motion for new trial was pend- 
ing, Bridges telegraphed the Secretary of Labour : 
“ This decision is outrageous. . . . Attempted enforcement 
of Schmidt decision will tie up port of Los Angeles and involve 
entire Pacific Coast. . . . The ILWU does not intend to allow 
state courts to override the majority vote of members in choos- 
ing its officers and representatives and to override the National 
Labor Relations Board.” 
Bridges published this telegram in the Los Angeles and San 
Francisco papers but Bridges alone was fined for contempt. 
I n  the Times-Mirror case, two labour unionists, who had been 
convicted of assaulting non-union truck-drivers, requested proba- 
tion. A month before the day set by the trial judge for passing 
on this application and pronouncing sentence, the Los Angeles 
Times published an editorial entitled “ Probation for Gorillas ? ” 
“ Two members of Dave Deck’s wrecking crew, entertain- 
ment committee, goon squad or gorillas . . . have asked for 
probation. . . . Sluggers for pay, like murderers for profit, 
are in a slightly different category from ordinary criminals. . . . 
“.It will teach no lesson to other thugs to put these men 
on good behaviour for a limited time. Their ‘ duty ’ would 
simply be taken over by others like them. If Beck’s thugs, 
however, are made to realise that they face San Quentin when 
they are caught, it will tend to make their disreputable occu- 
pation unpopular. Judge A. A. Scott will make a serious 
mistake if he grants probation to the defendants. This 
9 313 U.S. 33 (1940). 
10 314 U.S. 252 (1941). 
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community needs the example of their assignment to the jute 
mill.” 
For this the editor and the publisher were fined $100 each. 
After losing in the highest court of California, they appealed to the 
Supreme Court and won a five-to-four decision, along with their foe, 
Bridges. 
Mr. Justice Black delivered the opinion of the court (supported 
by Justices Reed, Douglas, Murphy and Jackson). He referred to 
the clear-and-present danger test as ‘‘ a working principle that the 
substantive evil must be extremely serious and the degree of immi- 
nence extremely high before utterances can be punished.” He 
refused to place publications which tended to obstruct the orderly 
administration of justice in a special category, to which this test 
of constitutional immunity from punishment would not be apglic- 
able. Comments on a pending case are as much entitled to the 
benefit of the test as other utterances about governmental action 
and public questions. 
What is the serious substantive evil to be averted ? Mr. Justice 
Black stated that it appears to be two-pronged: Disrespect for the 
judiciary;, and disorderly and unfair administration of justice. The 
first, he in effect discarded as a substantive evil. To consider it 
would “ be to impute to judges a lack of firmness, wisdom or 
honour-which we cannot accept.” “ The assumption that respect 
for the judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published 
criticism wrongly appraises the character of American public 
opinion.” 
The second-disorderly and unfair administration of justice- 
then is the substantive evil to be prevented and he intimated that 
this would be restricted to pending litigation. The court must 
examine the particular utterances and the circumstances of their 
publication to determine to what extent the evil of unfair adminis- 
tration of justice was likely to result, and what was the degree of 
likelihood. 
Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented and was joined by Chief 
Justice Stone and Justices Roberts and Bprnes. He recognised 
limits on the power to punish for contempt, but thought the 
majority had set the limits too narrowly. On the permissible side 
of the line he placed criticism of courts and judges in general and 
discussion of past or future cases. On the forbidden side he put 
publications which interfere with the impartial and calm disposi- 
tion of matters under judicial consideration. Later, in another 
opinion, he said that since judges, “ however stalwart, are human, 
the delicate task of administering justice ought not to be made 
unduly difficult by irresponrible print.” 
Two subsequent cases developed the philosophy of the Bridges 
case and attempted to define the limits of the clear and present 
11 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331 at 357 (1946). 
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danger test. In Pennekamp v. Florida,12 the court characterised 
the problem as one of striking “ a balance between the desirability 
of free discussion and the necessity for fair adjudication, free from 
interruption of its processes.)’ The court then proceeded to reverse 
the contempt citation, which grew out of a severe criticism of the 
court during a bench trial for rape, holding that although it must 
protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial, “ Freedom of discus- 
sion should be given the widest range compatible with the essential 
requirements of the fair and orderly administration of justice.’’ 
In  Craig v. Narney,ls the Press was cited for contempt in 
attacking the judge, an elected layman, who refused to accept a 
jury verdict in a forcible entry and detainer action. The criticism 
came after the trial but during the pendency of a motion for a new 
trial. The Supreme Court, in reversing, stated that freedom of the 
Press should not be impaired ‘‘ unless there is no doubt that the 
utterances . . . are a serious and imminent threat to the adminis- 
tration of justice.” “ The vehemence of the language used is not 
alone the measure of the power to punish for contempt. The fires 
which it kindles must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, 
threat to the administration of justice. The danger must not be 
remote or even probable; it must immediately imperil.” l4 
The Supreme Court’s formula seems to grant the Press a virtual 
immunity from contempt rather than resolve its historic struggle 
with the courts. Nevertheless, the actual scope of this immunity 
continues to be uncertain. First of all, the clear and present 
danger test has been reformulated in a non-contempt context. If 
the danger does not have to be imminent, the courts would have 
more control over Press interference. Modification of the immi- 
nence requirement may be forthcoming. In Dennis v. United 
States,15 the Supreme Court placed emphasis on the magnitude 
rather than the imminence of the evil. “ In each case (courts) 
must ask whether the gravity of the ‘ evil,’ discounted by its 
improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech as is necessary 
to avoid the danger.’’ The evil there was the overthrow of the 
government. 
In  addition, in each of the Supreme Court cases the danger 
asserted was to judge, not jury deliberations. Although no explicit 
distinction was made, the opinions leave room for the inference 
that the clear and present danger test might lead to different 
results if jury decisions are threatened. If jurors are more suscep- 
tible to influence than judges, then the same comment which 
constitutes no danger in the one instance could still be found a 
danger in the other. 
The judge-jury distinction was advanced for the first time in 
12 Ib id . ,  at 336 and 347. 
19 331 U.S. 367 (1947). 
14 Ib id . ,  at 373 and 376. 
1 5  310 U.S. 494 at 510 (1951). 
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State v. Baltimore Radio Show.16 A little girl had been brutally 
murdered in one of the parks of Washington, D.C. Ten days later, 
an eleven-year-old girl was dragged from her bicycle on one of the 
public streets of Baltimore, Maryland, and stabbed to death. 
Because of the similarity and atrociousness of the crimes, great 
public alarm was aroused and parents became most concerned for 
the safety of their children. Three nights later a Baltimore radio 
announcer opened his broadcast with the words ‘‘ Stand by for a 
sensation.” He then stated that Eugene James had been arrested 
and charged with the second murder. He went on to say that 
James had confessed to the crime, that he had a long criminal 
record, that he had gone to the scene of the crime with the police 
and there re-enacted the murder, and that he dug up the knife 
he had used to kill the little girl. Similar newscasts were made 
over other radio stations located within and without the state. 
Two months later James stood trial and was convicted of first 
degree murder, his confession and prior convictions being received 
in evidence. His counsel had waived jury trial because he felt he 
could not risk a jury trial in a community that had been so 
aroused. The trial was held before a three judge court. 
Three Maryland Broadcasting companies were cited for con- 
tempt under a rule of the court making it contempt to publish any 
matter “ which may prevent a fair trial, improperly influence the 
court or the jury, or tend in any manner to interfere with the 
administration of justice.” l7 The Criminal Court of Baltimore 
City found them guilty and imposed fines, the trial court stating 
that the broadcasts constituted “ not merely a clear and present 
danger to the administration of justice, but an actual obstruction 
of the administration of justice, in that they deprived the defen- 
dant of his constitutional right to have an impartial jury trial.” 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reversed the convic- 
tions.lD It relied largely upon the three decisions of the Supreme 
Court of the United States applying the “ clear and present 
danger ” test to the contempt power-that a publication to be 
contemptuous and not within the protection of the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments must constitute a clear and immediate 
threat to the administration of justice and a fair trial. To the 
argument that the three cases involved court trials and criticisms 
of judges and that a different view should be taken when juries or 
potential juries are concerned, the court dismissed the distinction 
as ‘‘ hardly tenable.” Judges are no more immune to human 
influences than the rest of mankind. Conversely, jurors are capable 
of the same firmness and impartiality as the judiciary. 
16 193 Md. 300, 67 A.2d 497 (1949). 
1 7  Ibid. ,  at 505. 
18 The opinion of the trial court is set out in Maryland V. Baltimore Radio 
19 See supra, note 16. 
Show, 338 U.S. 912 at 916 (1950). 
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The Supreme Court of the United States denied certiorari 2o 
but Mr. Justice Frankfurter wrote a long opinion emphasising that 
a denial of a petition for certiorari carries with it no implication 
regarding the court's views on the merits of the case. " The one 
thing that can be said with certainty about the court's denial of 
Maryland's petition in this case is that i t  does not remotely imply 
approval or disapproval of what was said by the Court of Appeals 
of Maryland." 21 The justice, a member of the court's minority 
in favour of a rule more restrictive of Press comment, supple- 
mented his opinion with a sixteen-page appendix cataloguing 
twent,ieth-century English cases concerning contempt of court for 
comments prejudicial to the fair administration of criminal justice. 
Unfortunately, the Baltimore case did not settle the possibility 
of a future judge-jury distinction. The specific refusal to affirm or 
reverse leaves state courts free to determine what limits the " clear 
and present danger " test sets on their power to  restrict Press 
comment in jury cases. Notwithstanding the Maryland court's 
refusal to  limit the presumption of fortitude to  judges, it is con- 
trary to one of the basic assumptions of the law of evidence to 
equate the stamina of judges and jurors. The assumption may 
be wrong but the rules of evidence are based upon it, namely, that 
jurors must be protected from the undue prejudice of improper 
evidence upon which, however, the judge may safely pass. And 
a trial judge who erroneously admits evidence in a trial before 
him alone will rarely, if ever, be reversed. The appellate courts 
assume that he excluded it from his deliberations.22 The greatest 
danger to fair trial in a jury case arises when the Press publishes 
evidence not admissible a t  the trial, such as a coerced confession 
or the defendant's criminal record. And admissible evidence may 
not be offered a t  the trial. I t s  publication in the Press is objec- 
tionable as not given under oath nor subject to cross-examination. 
Finally, produced evidence may be misrepresented by misleading 
headlines, one-sided selection of material, or other slanting of the 
report. 
In the United States, the contempt power is a negligible device 
for p ro techg  a defendant's right to a fair trial. As a result, the 
courts have resorted to other techniques in an effort to afford this 
prot.ection. The most common safeguards against prejudicial pre- 
trial publicity are a postponement of the trial, a change of venue 
and a careful voir dire examination of person: called for jury duty 
to  eliminate any prejudiced person.z3 None of these is satisfactory. 
A change of venue may involve delay, extra expense or incon- 
venience. I ts  utility is limited by the existence of state-wide- 
20 Mar! / ln t id  v. Boltitnore Radio Show, 338 U.S. 913 (1950). 
21 I b i d . .  at 919. 
22 See MrCorrnick. Eoidencc, 137 (1964). 
28 Sre Cottlrnent, " Free Press--Fair Trial." 50 .J.C.L. & Criiii. 371 (1959) ariil 
Note. " Free Press;  Fair  Trial-Rights in Collision." 34 S . Y . 1 7 . L . R c v .  12% 
(1989). 
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even regional and nation-wide-newspaper, radio and televisicn 
coverage. And if the .trial moves, the publicity may move with 
it. A continuance, too, may involve extra expense or incon- 
venience and there is always the possibility the publicity will be 
revived. Furthermore, the law with respect to changes of venue 
and continuances requires not only proof of prejudicial publicity 
but also of resulting public hostility so strong as to make a fair trial 
unlikely. This standard of proof is too high. With regard to the 
voir  dire it is not enough to show that prospective jurors have 
heard or read publicity items critical of the defendant. So long 
as the juror expresses an ability to decide the case solely on the 
evidence presented in court a challenge for cause will usually not 
be sustained. This is so even where the prospective juror admits 
having formed an opinion as to the defendant’s guilt or innocence, 
on the basis of the pre-trial publicity.24 Furthermore, defence 
counsel is placed in a real dilemma. If he questions jurors about 
Press reports he is likely to refresh their memories of the events 
reported or to drive home the importance of the remembered 
event. 
In  some situations the. defendant may waive jury trial and 
proceed before a judge. Defendant’s attorney felt compelled to do 
this in the Baltimore Radio case. However, in some states a jury 
trial cannot be waived in capital cases. In  others, the prosecutor 
must consent to the waiver and the judge approve and such consent 
or approval may not be forthcoming.2s Lastly, the defendant may 
wish to exercise his constitutional right to a jury trial. To coerce 
its waiver by Press publicity raises additional difficult questions 
of due process. 
During the trial itself reports are often highly coloured and 
replete with editorial comment on the evidence and the conduct 
of the proceedings. In cases which arouse strong public feeling 
the Press may become highly partisan, sometimes trying to outdo 
the parties in procuring evidence and publishing material ruled 
inadmissible because of its prejudicial effect. Thus, the problem 
of assuring an accused a fair and impartial trial by jury does not 
end with the impanelling of an “ impartial ” jury. The jurors 
must remain impartial. 
Instructions by the trial judge at  the outset and close of the 
trial that jurors should avoid reading or listening to commentaries 
on the trial and that only the evidence presented in court should 
be considered in reaching a verdict are usually considered sufficient 
to protect the defendant against inflammatory publicity. Although 
these instructions may keep jurors away from prejudicial publica- 
tions it is difficult to understand how they prevent jurors from 
being unconsciously influenced by what they have already read. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See Donnelly, “ The Defendant’s Right to Waive Jury Trial in Criminal 
Cases.” 9 U.Fla.L.Rev. 247 (1956). 
M.\P.CII 1961 CONTEMPT BY PUBLICATION IN THE U.S. 247 
Not infrequently jurors do read inflammatory newspaper pub- 
licity during *the trial. When this occurs the usual practice has 
been for the judge to  question them as to whether they have been 
prejudiced and whether they can still decide solely on the basis 
of the evidence offered in court. If the jurors answer that they 
can still decide solely on the basis of the evidence a motion for a 
mistrial is usually denied. However, in lllarshall v. United 
States,26 the Supreme Court recently reversed a conviction where 
this had occurred. The petitioner was convicted of selling drugs 
without the required prescriptions. In  an effort to refute the 
defence of entrapment, the Government sought to  prove that he 
had previously practised medicine without a licence. The trial 
judge refused the offer of proof as having no bearing on the issues 
and as too prejudicial. During the course of the trial two news- 
paper accounts containing this information came to the attention 
of some of the jurors. The judge called the jurors into his 
chambers and asked each of them whether they had seen these 
articles. Although some had read the articles, all stated they had 
not been influenced by them and that they could decide the case 
solely on the basis of the evidence of record. Thereupon the trial 
judge denied the motion for a mistrial. The Supreme Court 
reversed on the ground that if the information was so prejudicial 
that  the trial judge refused to admit it, i t  was error to deny the 
motion for a mistrial, since the prejudice i t  would arouse was sure 
to be as great if read in the newspaper. The court recognised the 
large discretion of the trial judge in ruling on the issue of prejudice 
resulting from the reading by jurors of news articles concerning 
the trial but apparently felt the facts of the Marshall case were 
quite special. Although this may indicate nothing more than a 
sensitivity toward the special facts of this case an element of 
uncertainty into an area which appeared well-settled has been 
introduced. Lower courts may read the decision as a limitation of 
their discretion and feel compelled to grant a mistrial where 
formerly they would have denied the motion. It should be noted 
that the decision was not based on any constitutional ground of 
due process but upon the general supervisory power of the court 
to  formulate and apply proper standards for enforcement of the 
criminal law in the federal courts. 
That Press conduct and prejudicial newspaper coverage may 
be so flagrant as to violate due process was indicated by Justices 
Jackson and Frankfurter in Sheppnrd v. Florida.27 There the 
defendants had been convicted of rape and sentenced to death. A 
majority of the court reversed because of racial discrimination in 
jury selection. However, Mr. Justice Jackson wrote a concurring 
opinion in which Frankfurter joined, charging the majority with 
20 360 U.S. 310 (1959). 
27 341 U.S. 50 (1951). 
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emphasising the trivial and ignoring the important issues. 
said 2 8 :  
He 
“ But prejudicial influences outside the courtroom, becom- 
ing all too typical of a highly publicised trial, were brought to 
bear on this jury with such force that the conclusion is inescap- 
able that these defendants were prejudged as guilty and the 
trial was but a legal gesture to register a verdict already 
dictated by the Press and the public opinion which it 
generated .” 
As the Sheppard case, the Hauptmann case,29 and others,ao 
indicate, many American newspapers handle crime news so unfairly 
and sensationally that they deprive the accused of an impartial 
jury. If they lived in England, the majority of American news- 
paper editors and crime reporters would probably be sent to jail 
for contempt. 
‘‘ Murder and mystery, society, sex and suspense were 
combined in this case in such a manner as to intrigue and 
captivate the public fancy to a degree perhaps unparalleled in 
recent annals. Throughout the pre-indictment investigation, 
the subsequent legal skirmishes and the nine-week trial, circu- 
lation-conscious editors catered to the insatiable interest of the 
American public in the bizarre. Special seating facilities for 
reporters and columnists representing local papers and all 
major news services were installed in the courtroom. Special 
rooms in the Criminal Courts Building were equipped for 
broadcasters and telecasters. In  this atmosphere of a ‘ Roman 
holiday ) for the news media, Sam Sheppard stood trial for his 
life.” 
Notwithstanding this exegesis the Supreme Court of Ohio 31 
upheld Sam Sheppard’s conviction of second-degree murder, and 
the Supreme Court of the United States declined 32 to review the 
case. 
There is much dissatisfaction in the United States with existing 
efforts to resolve the conflict between a free Press and an impartial 
trial. Prejudicial publicity constitutes a serious threat to an 
accused’s right to an impartial jury trial. He is without adequate 
means to combat it. Various solutions have been proposed. 
Perhaps the chief source of prejudicial publicity is the Press 
release or conference by persons connected with the trial-defence 
or prosecuting attorneys or police officers. A typical example is 
Strobel v. S t a t e  of California.33 Strobel was apprehended in con- 
nection with the brutual sex murder of a six-year-old girl. His 
28 I b i d . ,  at 51. 
29 For an excellent account of this ’case see Robbins, “ T h e  Hauptmann Trial 
30 The cases are collected ,,in Wolfram, “ F r e e  Press, Fair  Trial and the 
31 State v. Slieppard, 1G5 Ohio St. 293, 135 N.E. ad 340 (1956). 
32 352 U.S. 910 (1956). 
33 313 V.S. 181 (1952). 
Here is another example of quite recent date: 
in the Light of English Criminal Procedure,” 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935). 
Responsthility of the Bar, (1954) 1 Crim.L.Rev. 3. 
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arrest and subsequent confession attracted what Mr. Justice Clark 
referred to  as “ a spate of newspaper publicity.” For, in the 
words of the court, “ between the time of the murder and the time 
of petitioner’s arrest, newspapers of general circulation in the 
Los Angeles area featured in banner headlines the ‘ manhunt ’ 
which the police were conducting for petitioner. On the day of 
petitioner’s arrest these newspapers printed extensive . excerpts 
from his confession in the District Attorney’s office, the details of 
the confession having been released to the Press by the District 
Attorney a t  periodic intervals while petitioner was giving the con- 
fession. On the following Monday, four days later, Los Angeles 
newspapers reprint.ed the full text of that confession as it was read 
into the record at  the preliminary hearing. Most of these events 
were given top billing on the front page of the papers, and were 
accompanied by large headlines. Petitioner was variously des- 
cribed, both in headlines and in the text of news stories, as a 
‘ werewolf,’ a ‘ fiend,’ a ‘ sex-mad killer,’ and the like. The 
District Attorney announced to the Press his belief that petitioner 
was guilty and sane.” 34 
Strobel’s conviction was affirmed by the Supremc Court of 
California and, later, by the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Mr. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, stated that petitioner 
had failed to demonstrate that the newspaper accounts had 
aroused against him such prejudice in the community as to “ neces- 
sarily prevent a fair trial.” 3s In his dissent, Mr. Justice 
Frankfurter stated 3n : 
“ I cannot agree to uphold a conviction which affirmatively 
treats newspaper participation instigated by the prosecutor as 
part of the traditional concept of the ‘ American way of the 
conduct of a trial.’ ” 
Although Canon 20 of Professional Ethics 37 looks with strong 
distaste upon any attorney who publicises his case, it has largely 
been ineffective. Not only has it not been enforced by the Bar 
but is inadequate in it,s phrasing. I t  does not cover releases made 
by law enforcement officers other than attorneys nor releases made 
to radio or television media. Nor does it strictly condemn all or a 
particular type of publicity but merely states that generally pub- 
licity is to  bc condemned. If Bar associations would get tough 
with members who give tips and stories to thc Press in violation 
3 4  I b i d . ,  a t  192. 
3.5 I b i d . ,  a t  193. 
36 I b i d . ,  a t  201. 
37 ABA,  Canons of Professional Ethics KO. 00, sbates : “ Yewspaper piiblicationc 
by a lawyer as  to pending or anticipated litigation may interfere with a fair 
trial in the courts ant1 otherwise prejudice the due  administration of justice. 
Genrrally they arcs to be condenined. If the extreme circumstances of a 
particnlar case justify a statement to the public, i t  is unprofessional to make 
it nnonyrnoiisly. An EX p a r t e  reference to the facts should not go beyond 
quotation from the records and papers on file in  the cq;Irt; but even in 
extreme cases it is better to avoid any  e x  par te  statement. 
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of Professional Canon No. 20, defendants in criminal jury trials 
would receive considerable protection since such ‘( leaked out ” 
information is far more damaging to the accused than mere con- 
clusions by the Press as to his guilt or innocence. 
I n  the United States there is a right of appeal from a criminal 
contempt conviction. Although full review is not always given 
in state courts, it is now the federal practice. A full review seems 
highly desirable, particularly when the contempt charged contained 
elements of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. 
In some quarters today there are suggestions for additional 
procedural reforms. Recently, three justices of the Supreme Court 
were willing to wipe out a century and a half of legislative and 
judicial history by holding that contempts not committed in the 
presence of the court are c c  entitled to be tried by a jury after 
indictment by a grand jury and in full accordance with all the 
procedural safeguards required by the Constitution for ‘ all criminal 
prosecutions.’ ” Green v. United States involved the sum- 
mary conviction of two Communist leaders who, after being con- 
victed for violation of the Smith Act, had jumped bail and had 
hidden out for five years. . Four mepbers of the court, speaking 
through Justice Harlan, voted to sustain the conviction. “ The 
answer to those who see in the contempt power a potential instru- 
ment of oppression lies in assurance of its careful use and super- 
vision, not in imposition of artificial limitations on the power.” 40 
Mr. Justice Black, joined by the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice 
Douglas, filed a vigorous and eloquent dissent. Black admitted he 
was opposing an unbroken line of Supreme Court decisions but 
thought these decisions had been based on the assumption that the 
summary contempt power ran back in English law beyond the 
memory of man. Citing a great deal of historical research, includ- 
ing that of Sir John Fox 41 and Professor F r a n k f ~ r t e r , ~ ~  Black 
concluded that there had been no “ immemorial usage ” allowing 
summary punishment. It was probably not older than the 
eighteenth century. Since the opinion of Mr. Justice Wilmot, who 
was responsible for the ‘( immemorial usage ” legend, had not been 
published until after the adoption of the Constitution, and since 
the Founding Fathers had shown such concern for jury trials, 
Black was unconvinced that the Framers had meant to exclude 
contempt from the normal procedural protections. 
The intent of the Framers, however, was probably less impor- 
tant to his dissent than the belief that no official should be granted 
“ autocratic power ”: 
38 Green v.  United States, 356 U.S. 165 at 195 (1958). 
39 356 U.S. 165 (1958). 
40 I b t d .  at 188. 
4 1  F o x .  C o n t c t ~ v t  of Court (1907). 
4 2  Frankfurter k Landis, “ Power to Regulate Contempts,” 37 Harv.L.Rer. 
1010 (1924). 
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“ When the responsibilities of lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, 
jury, and disciplinarian are thrust upon a judge he is obvi- 
ously incapable of holding the scales of justice perfectly fair 
and true and reflecting impartially on the guilt or innocence 
of the accused.” 43  
Mr. Justice Brennan added a fourth dissent on the ground that 
there was insufficient evidence to justify a finding beyond a reason- 
able doubt that the defendants had knowledge that the surrender 
order had been entered. 
This four-to-four division made Mr. Justice Frankfurter’s vote 
crucial. Filing a separate opinion, Frankfurter, the judge, rele- 
gated Frankfurter, the professor, to a lower place in the judicial 
process: “ The fact that scholarship has shown that historical 
assumptions regarding the procedure for punishment of contempt 
of court were ill-founded, hardly wipes out a century and a half 
of the legislative and judicial history of federal law based on such 
assumptions.” 4 4  After calling the roll of the fifty-three distin- 
guished justices of the Supreme Court who had upheld the sum- 
mary contempt power, Frankfurter found himself unwilling to 
break with tradition and voted to sustain the conviction. 
Mr. Justice Black also made the suggestive observation that the 
tendency of the court to restrict the substantive scope of the con- 
tempt power to  narrow bounds is attributable in substantial part to 
‘‘ a deeply felt antipathy toward the arbitrary procedures now used 
to  punish contempts.” 4 5  
Comment on the work of a court not related to pending pro- 
ceedings ranges from a law journal’s calm discussion of the merits 
of a decision to  a libellous attack upon the integrity of the judge. 
The English courts declare the right to  honest criticism of thc work 
of the court but reserve the power to punish scandalous attacks 
upon the court itself. This power has been used Infrequently but 
two rathcr recent examplcs show that it will be used on occasion. 
One is It. v. Editor  of the Xew S t a t r s ? t i ~ i n . ~ ~  In this case, the 
editor commented upon a case in which Dr. Marie Storm, an 
advocate of birth control, had suffered a verdict against her in a 
libel action for suggesting that the Jlorning Post had suddenly 
refused to print her advertisements because of Roman Catholic 
influence. The IVew Stutestnan’s article said: “ The serious point 
in this case, however, is that an individual owning to such views as 
those of Dr. Stopes cannot apparently hope for a fair hearing in a 
court presided over by Mr. Justice Avory-and there are so many 
Avorys.” The editor was found guilty of contempt and ordered 
to  pay all costs of the proceedings. The editorial “ imputed,” 
said Lord Hewart, “ unfairness and lack of impartiality to a judge 
4 3  356 U.S. 165 at 1!3. 
4 4  I b i d . ,  at 183. 
4 5  I b z d . ,  at 196. note 5 
4 0  ( 1 ~ 8 )  44  fr.r,.R. :m. 
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in the discharge of his judicial duties. The gravamen of the offence 
was that by lowering his authority it interfered with the perform- 
ance of his judicial duties." 41 
In R. v. C o Z ~ e y , ~ ~  the 
editor of Truth was ordered to pay a fine of El00 and costs for 
having commented on Lord Justice Slesser's judgment in the case 
of R. v. Minister of Labour in the following terms: " Lord Justice 
Slesser, who can hardly be altogether unbiased about legislation of 
this type, maintained that really it was a very nice provisional 
order or as good a one as can be expected in this vale of tears." 
Lord Justice Slesser had been attorney-general in a former Labour 
government which supported this legislation. Professor .Goodhart 
has commented on the case as follows: " This case seems to carry 
the doctrine of constructive contempt to its extreme limits, for the 
administration of justice can hardly have been seriously endangered 
by the editor's mild but expansive humour." 49 
Prior to the Bridges case the majority of the states held that 
this branch of the contempt power violated constitutional principles 
of free speech and in the Bridges case the Supreme Court cate- 
gorically rejected " disrespect for the judiciary " as a substantive 
evil which would warrant' any form of restriction upon speech. 
This exercise of the contempt power has little justification and is 
subject to much abuse. The rationale for punishing abusive 
attacks upon the court is that they create public dissatisfaction 
with the judiciary and the administration of justice. As a result 
parties are discouraged from bringing rightful claims to the courts 
and may ultimately take the law into their own hands. The 
countervailing argument is that the only way for courts to secure 
public respect is to earn it by the ability, impartiality and essen- 
tial justice of their proceedings; that if the courts are inefficient, 
biased or corrupt, they should' be quickly exposed and the evil 
eliminated. 
Although the Administration of Justice Act of 1960 so does not 
appear to deal with " scandalising the court," it has made changes 
in the law of contempt that meet with considerable approval by 
those in the United States who advocate a restoration of the power 
to punish for contempts by publication. In authorising an appeal 
in cases of contempt of court, the Act is in agreement with long- 
standing practice in the United States. Section 12, which provides 
that the publication of information relating to proceedings in 
private shall not in itself constitute contempt of court, with certain 
exceptions, is in accord with the law in most American jurisdic- 
tions. Apparently, the purpose of the section is to modify the 
judgment in Alliance Building Society v. Belrum, L t d S 1  
A later case reached a similar result. 
4 7  I b i d . .  at 305. 
4 8  See Yote (1931) 47 L.Q.R. 315. 
49 Goodhart. " N e ~ s p a p e r s  and. Contempt of Court in English Law," 48 Haw. 
.TO 8 R- 9 E'iz. 2 ,  c .  G5. 5 1  [1957] 1 All E.R. 635. 
1 J . R e V .  885 at 904 (1935). 
See p. 061, post .  
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It is section 11, however, that is of most interest. R .  v. 
Odhams Press L t d J Z  and R .  v. G ~ i f i t h s , ~ ~  imposing strict 
liability for innocent publication and dissemination, were not 
greatly admired in the United States. These two cases were 
apparently the targets of section 11, which makes lack of know- 
ledge & &  having taken all reasonable care " a defence. Although 
the Supreme Court of the United States has not passed on the 
question of strict liability for contemptuous publications it has 
shown a reluctande to extend the area in which strict liability can 
be made the basis of criminal liability. The recent case of Smith 
v. California Ji is illustrative. Appellant, the proprietor of a book- 
store, was convicted under a Los Angeles ordinance making it 
unlawful " for any person to  have in his possession any obscene 
or indecent writing, (or) book . . . in any place of business where 
. . . books . . . are sold or kept for sale." Appellant was convicted 
on the basis of possession alone. The ordinance had been con- 
strued by the California court as requiring no element of scienter- 
knowledge by appellant of the contents of the book-and thus the 
ordinance was construed as imposing strict or absolute liability. 
I n  holding the ordinance unconstitutional, Mr. Justice Brennan 
writing for the majority said 5 5 :  
" The appellee and the court below analogise this strict- 
liability penal ordinance to familiar forms of penal statutes 
which dispense with any element of knowledge on the part of 
the person charged, food and drug legislation being a principal 
example. We find the analogy instructive in our examination 
of the question before us. The usual rationale for such 
statutes is that the public interest in the purity of its food is 
so great as to warrant the imposition of the highest standard 
of care on distributors-in fact an absolute standard which 
will not hear the distributor's plea as to the amount of care 
he has used. . . . His ignorance of the character of the food is 
irrelevant. There is no specific constitutional inhibition 
against making the distributors of food the strictest censors of 
their merchandise, but the constitutional guarantees of the 
freedom of speech and of the Press stand in the way of 
imposing a similar requirement on the bookseller. By dis- 
pensing with any requirement of knowledge of the contents 
of the book on the part of the seller, the ordinance tends to 
impose a severe limitation on the public's access to constitu- 
tionally protected matter. For if the bookseller is criminally 
liable without knowledge of the contents, and the ordinance 
fulfils its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books he sells to 
those he has inspected; and thus the state will have imposed 
a restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected 
as well as obscene literature. It has been well observed of a 
statute construed as dispensing with any requirement of 
5 2  119571 1 Q.B. 73. See Note (1957) 73 L.Q.R. 8. Also, see Hall Wtlltaitr\, 
54 361 U.S. 147 (1959). JJ Ibzd .  at 152. 
' '  T'ntntentimal (:onteinpt of Court " (1957) 20 M.L.R. 275 at 27fL 
53 r i w i  3 Q.B. 192. 
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scienter that: ‘ Every bookseller would be placed under an 
obligation to make himself aware of the contents of every book 
in his shop. It would be altogether unreasonable to demand 
so near an approach to omniscience ’: The King v. Ewart ,  25 
N.Z.L.R. 709, 729 (C.A.). And the bookseller’s burden would 
become the public’s burden, for by restricting him the public’s 
access to reading matter would be restricted. If the contents 
of bookshops and periodical stands were restricted to material 
of which their proprietors had made an insp,ection, they might 
be. depleted indeed. The bookseller’s limitation in the amount 
of reading material with which he could familiarise himself, 
and his timidity in the face of his absolute criminal liability, 
thus would tend to restrict the public’s access to forms of the 
printed word which the state could not constitutionally sup- 
press directly. The bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by 
the state, would be a censorship affecting the whole public, 
hardly less virulent for being privately administered. Through 
it, the distribution of all books, both obscene and not obscene, 
would be impeded.” 
A similar rationale would condemn absolute liability in con- 
tempt cases. 
Perhaps the most effective way ‘to give real meaning to the 
guarantee of an impartial jury trial in the United States is to 
restore the contempt power to the courts. Is it possible to draft 
a narrow contempt statute that would survive American constitu- 
tional limitations and still be effective? Such a statute to cover 
the period beginning with the bringing of formal charges (or 
perhaps when arrest is imminent) and ending with conviction or 
acquittal. First 
of all, in the Bridges case Mr. Justice Black said 5a: 
“ It is to be noted at once that we have no direction by 
the legislature of California that publications outside the court 
room which comment upon a pending case in a specified 
manner should be punishable. As we said in Cantwell v. 
Connecticut, 810 U.S. 296, 807-808, such a ‘ declaration of 
the State’s policy would weigh heavily in any challenge of the 
law as infringing constitutional limitations.’ But as we also 
said there, the problem is different where ‘ the judgment is 
based on a common law concept of the most general and 
undefined nature. . . .’ For here the legislature of California 
has not appraised a particular kind of situation and found a 
specific danger sufficiently imminent to justify a restriction on 
a particular kind of utterance. The judgments below, there- 
fore, do not come to us encased in the armor wrought by 
prior legislative deliberation.” 
Secondly, in denying certiorari in the Ba!timore case, the court 
There are reasons to believe it could be done. 
56 314 U.S. 252 at 260 (1941). In reliance upon this quotation, at least one 
state has upheld the constitutionality of its contempt statute. Weston v. 
Commonwealth, 195 Va. 175, 77 S.E. 2d 405 (1953). noted in 22 Geo.Wash. 
L.Rev. 242 (1953). Also see People v. Goss, 10 Ill. 2d 633, 141 N.E. 2d 3f35 
(1957) and Re Jameson, 340 P.2d 423 (Col. 1959) (dissenting opinion). 
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has left open the judge-jury distinction and has not specified the 
limits the " clear and present danger " test sets on the powers of 
courts to restrict Press comment in jury cases. 
Thirdly, the test itself has been reinterpreted in the Smith Act 
cases as emphasising probability rather than imminence. This 
new interpretation has not been applied as yet in the contempt 
context. 
It also appears that a statute would have a better chance of 
survival if it provided certain procedural safeguards for the defen- 
dant such as a right of appeal, a jury trial, a trial before a different 
judge, and a limitation on the amount of fine or term of imprison- 
ment that could be imposed for violations. 
On the substantive side, it would be unwise to use broad and 
general terms that could be construed as re-enacting the common 
law contempt power. Instead, a legislative determination of 
specific evils threatening a fair trial should be specified. Some of 
the types of situations that might be covered are the following: 
1. The issuance by the police authorities, the prosecutor, 
counsel for the defence, or any other person having official 
connection with the case of any of the following: 
(a) Any criminal record or photograph of the accused 
except as part of an official notice to alert the com- 
munity to  the fact that a potentially dangerous person 
is eluding or has escaped from lawful custody; 
(b) Any alleged confession or admission of fact bearing 
upon the guilt of the accused; 
( c )  Any statement of personal opinion as to the guilt of the 
accused ; 
(d) Any statement that a witness will testify to certain facts 
or opinions; 
(e) Any comment upon evidence already introduced ; 
(f) Any comment as to the credibility of any witness; 
(g) Any statement of matter excludcd from evidence by the 
2. The publication by newspaper, magazine, radio or television 
of any material obtained as a result of a violation of the 
statute. 
These instances are meant to be suggestive rather than defini- 
tive but they do cover most of the abuses by officials and the Press 
in the United States. With appropriate changes the same restric- 
tions could be made applicable to civil cases. And, underlying 
them all, should be the elimination of absolute liability. Criminal 
liability in this area should be limited to intentional or reckless 
conduct. Whether negligence should be a basis of liability is more 
debatable. 
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